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Germany
and the
Peace of Europe

by

Ferdinand Schevill

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GERMANY · AND · THE PEACE · OF · EUROPE

BY · FERDINAND · SCHEVILL ·
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FOREWORD

The Germanistic Society plans to issue a series of pamphlets to appear from time to time, dealing with the war in Europe and its underlying causes. The Society has solicited contributions from various writers and historians. The pamphlets are to serve the cause of truth, to correct misrepresentations, and to exemplify the spirit of objectivity and fair play.

Copies of these pamphlets are for sale at the office of the Society at the following prices:

Single copies.....	\$ 0.05
10 copies.....	0.25
100 copies.....	1.50
1000 copies (f. o. b. Chicago)	10.00

Profits, if any, will be turned over to the Society of the Red Cross.

THE GERMANISTIC SOCIETY
OF CHICAGO.

LOUIS GUENZEL, Recording Secretary
332 So. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill.

Germany and the Peace of Europe

The National Program at the Birth of the German Empire

In 1871, after many centuries of division, the German people again became a united nation. The political change from weakness to strength was deeply gratifying, but more gratifying still was the inner moral change which presently asserted itself. Every German felt a new hopefulness, a hitherto unknown buoyancy of spirit, and as the barely awakened and backward nation looked about in a world where it had at last won a position of respect, it formed the desire to close the gap that yawned between it and its most advanced neighbors, and to take its place in the foremost rank of civilization. This was no mean ambition for a people that had, as it were, only just arrived at its majority, especially as the whole nation realized that it could achieve its end only by steady and unflinching work.

But could work alone, crude and haphazard work, perform the necessary miracle? Germany was not a country lavishly endowed with riches, she was heavily hampered in addition by her late start, and presently groping her way, she began to see that only work of a special kind would profit—organized work, directed steadily to a preconceived end, and taking systematic advantage of all the discoveries of modern science. On this basis, signifying alert intelligence and trained efficiency, Germany gradually arranged her national house, and before long the fruits of her labor began to crowd her markets and storehouses, giving assurance of ever waxing harvests.

This is not the place to describe what the Germans have accomplished in the short period of less than half a century since the foundation of the empire. Such a description is a special study involving a review of economics, trade statistics, pure and applied science, education, etc., and has often been undertaken, in many cases by admiring Americans who have felt that our own people can only gain by a familiar knowledge with what the Germans have achieved. But

a few general facts may be rapidly recalled. Since 1871 Germany has effected a transformation of herself into an industrial country. With England and the United States she is in a special class, to which the rest of the world concedes unquestioned leadership. Her growing industrial production has enabled her to develop her commerce which has gradually passed that of her European rivals until today it is second only to that of England. At the same time she has increased her shipping with the result that her merchant marine now touches every port and weaves a net that encircles the globe. But while building up her trade and industry she did not abandon agriculture. Realizing that her relatively poor soil needed special treatment, she harnessed science to the plow and was rewarded by abundant crops that enabled her to feed a larger number of her population than far more favored lands. And since all this material progress had its root in knowledge and the development and organization of knowledge is the business of education, the country built up a system of schools, which from the lowest to the highest grades, from the elementary schools with their continuation features to the universities with their research laboratories, invited the attention and the emulation of the world. Finally the arts, which sum up the meaning of life and lift our toiling race from bleak drudgery to the heights of joy and understanding, were touched with the buoyant spirit of the time, and German music, drama, sculpture, and architecture gave birth to contributions which hold an honored place by the side of those of all the other leading nations.

Tireless work, intelligent work, work covering every department of human activity—that is the true meaning and content of German history since the achievement of German unity. And since whoever works must be at peace, peace became the heartfelt wish of the whole people. The people, yes—but was it also the wish of the German government? For the desire of the people is often one thing and the will of the government is another. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the German government from the very first identified itself with the national program and undertook energetically to direct the manifold labors of the people. No other modern government has, on the whole, co-operated so intelligently with the free powers of its citizens. But in order to inspire that confidence without which work will always remain half-hearted and ineffective, the government was obliged to make the maintenance of a long and durable peace the prime object of its care. Without peace no productive national labor, without labor no leadership in civilization—the argument was so simple that it would have taken a government of the blind not to see that peace was the first and foremost condition of all progress and well-being.

PURPOSE OF THIS LEAFLET.

It is the purpose of this leaflet to pass in brief review the relation of the German government to the great question of European peace from the foundation of the empire to the outbreak of the present lamentable war. Much will perforce be omitted, much that is treated will prove susceptible to a somewhat different valuation, but the whole should none the less make a clear and intelligible story of the terrible animosities and rivalries of the great European powers.

THE CESSION OF ALSACE AND LORRAINE.

It is well known that the unification of the German people encountered many hindrances and was finally achieved at the cost of a terrible war with France. Those hindrances and that war will not be treated here further than to recall the treaty which concluded the successful struggle with the French. By the terms thereof France paid Germany an indemnity of one billion dollars and surrendered the border provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. It is very certain that the terms created a rancor in the French mind that has not softened with the passing of time, and that the Alsace-Lorraine question has been the cause of a permanent and incurable division between Germany and France. This circumstance has often suggested the thought, to kindly outsiders whether a different treatment would not have proved both a nobler and a sounder policy. It must be the hope of all humanitarians that the time is coming when generosity will play a larger role in the relations of peoples and governments; the fact to set down here is that in 1871 it was a luxury not greatly cultivated in the political circles of Europe. And, therefore, if political generosity was foreign to the councils of Germany it was at least equally foreign to the opinion of France. The relation of the two neighbors up to the struggle of 1870 had been a story of many centuries of warfare in which France, as the stronger, had been generally successful, taking district after district from her rival. The very provinces of Alsace and Lorraine had been won in this way. As late as the period of the French revolution France had annexed the whole left bank of the Rhine, and under Napoleon had subjected practically the whole of Germany to her rule. The revolutionary conquests were indeed disgorged at the downfall of the great Corsican, but the hope of the Rhine boundary, their "natural" boundary as the French persistently call it even in their most recent school books, remained an unwritten part of French policy. Napoleon III, in emulation of his great uncle, looked eagerly to the Rhine, and if the scales in the struggle of 1870 had inclined the other way, there can be no reason-

able doubt that the annexation of the Bavarian Palatinate and the neighboring districts would have been the demand of the victor. The generosity that did not lie in the age-long policy of France toward Germany, she hardly had the right to ask Germany to practice toward her. In annexing the two provinces Germany conceived herself as doing no more than settling an old historical account.

THE POLICY OF BISMARCK.

None the less it is undeniable that the new empire began its existence with a serious difficulty. It had to reckon with a certain renewal of the war as soon as France felt herself strong enough for the test of arms. For this reason Bismarck, the first chancellor of the empire and the director of its foreign affairs, resolved to cultivate good relations with Austria and Russia, for, he argued, without the aid of another great military power France would not undertake her war of revenge and continued peace would be assured. He was successful to a remarkable degree, for Austria and Russia entered into a formal alliance with him which lasted till the war of 1877-1878 between Russia and Turkey. That war ended the intimate understanding between Germany and Russia, because in the course of it Austria and Russia appeared as implacable rivals in the Balkan peninsula, and in spite of continued efforts to stand well with both sides Bismarck was at last forced to choose between them. He chose Austria and in the year 1879 signed with her the alliance which has lasted to this day.

From now on Russia, though always seeing in Austria her chief enemy, was profoundly irritated with Germany too and began to revolve plans for checking her power. To join hands with France across Germany would seem the natural way of satisfying this purpose, but such an intimacy failed at first to appeal to Russia, largely because the French republic cultivated a form of government that was anathema to the absolute Czar. But this theoretical repulsion wore down in time, especially as the Austro-German alliance showed no signs of weakening. On the contrary, its dominant position in central Europe was still further affirmed, when in 1883 Italy knocked for admission at Berlin and converted the dual into a triple alliance. The result was that Russia, uneasy in her isolation, more and more sought the society of France and in the year 1892 concluded an alliance with her. Europe was now divided into two camps which eyed each other threateningly but were sufficiently well balanced to offer an untrustworthy guarantee against a general war. In spite of a horde of disturbing "incidents," the quiet of Europe was always in

the end assured. But the ominous fact remained that, though all the powers were on every occasion profuse in their professions of peace, there were two ever-present issues which might almost unawares lead to a conflagration: one was the Franco-German issue, the other the Austro-Russian one. With regard to the former, the French desire for revenge supplied a steady element of ferment while what threatened to precipitate an Austro-Russian conflict was the Russian plan to play a dominant role in the Balkan peninsula and to accelerate the demise of the Sick Man of the Bosphorus. Since France and Russia pursued aims tending to alter existing relations, the dual alliance had something of the character of an offensive association, while the triple alliance, resting on its arms, could claim to be more strictly defensive.

ENTERS ENGLAND.

Thus matters stood till, toward the end of the last century, England began to take a warmer interest in the situation. She had hitherto held aloof from the continent, priding herself on what her statesmen called her splendid isolation. But in the nineties her attention became more and more directed upon the development of Germany. The program of national labor to which that country had devoted itself had begun to tell by an increased industrial production, a rapidly swelling commerce, and the creation of a splendid merchant marine. At the same time the German government undertook to build a navy. With this naval program the reigning Emperor, William II, who had mounted the throne in 1888, particularly identified himself, backing it with such extraordinary enthusiasm that the navy became his special hobby. "Our future lies upon the ocean" became a catch word which, first pronounced by him, passed from mouth to mouth. He desired, he said on many an occasion, to point out to his countrymen that their landlocked, philistine outlook was ridiculous, and that if they wished to emulate the free carriage of Englishmen they would, like them, have to seek their opportunities in all the corners of the globe. The navy, the Emperor and his government declared, was begun because every power worthy of the name had a navy; and because with the steady growth of colonial and shipping interests, adequate means for their protection became an imperative necessity. In short, the German navy was a defensive measure, not a threat.

But England did not see the German development in that light. Already aroused from her long dream of commercial supremacy by the appearance of German merchants in all the markets of Europe, Asia, and America, she was profoundly irritated by the aspiration of Germany to become a sea power. Her comfortable primacy was

shaken, and sorely against her will and at very heavy expense, she felt obliged to build warships in order to maintain the unquestioned command of the seas, which she coveted as an English prerogative and which she considered as essential to her security. The result was a mad race of armaments in which the other powers joined. England on several occasions proposed a halt, but met with no encouragement from Germany who persistently declared that she was not building her navy to the injury of anyone, but singly and solely with a view to her defensive necessities. Of these only she could judge: England in her turn was free to build whatever she considered adequate to her own security.

This naval issue between Germany and England will prove a difficult matter for the historian of the future. Would it have been wiser for Germany to keep the good will of England by building a navy of such limited dimensions that she would have given her neighbor no reasonable ground for disquietude? While the question is open to debate, the right of Germany as a sovereign power to build such a naval force as she might judge she needed is incontestable. On the other hand it is also clear that if England, after repeated warnings, chose to be offended, Germany would have to take that hostility into the bargain. Politics is politics, and it is not the statesman's business to lament the selfishness or depravity of a rival, but to reckon with the conditions created by that rival's sentiments. If Germany had the right to build a great navy—which can hardly be denied—England, whether her reasons were petty or magnanimous, had an equal right to take offense. And the European consequences of this offense, it behooved the German government to take into prompt consideration. For these consequences were not slow in appearing: England, hitherto neutral, drifted into the dual alliance. Who was right and who was wrong? The ethical argument has been tossed to and fro in a thousand articles and pamphlets. But it is manifestly unprofitable to subject an isolated phenomenon to moral considerations. We are here telling a tale that unfolds itself on the diplomatic plane and the doubts that rise to the mind resolve themselves into two political questions. Was it wise for Germany to press her plans for a navy to the point of making an enemy of powerful England? And again, was it wise for England to join the dual alliance and thus tremendously stimulate the secret hopes of France and Russia?

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

England's diplomatic action was not precipitate, but by 1904 she had drawn close to France and a few years later she squared a list

of old accounts with Russia. The terms of her agreements with these two powers have never been published, but they involved at least an entente or understanding and therewith Europe was divided into two armed camps as before, but now without a single power to mediate between them. The good angel, peace, whom all continued to profess to cherish, increasingly led a wretched hand-to-mouth existence, because beneath the smooth professions of the lips stirred more and more explosively the dread ideas of war. And although the Franco-German issue of the annexed provinces and the Anglo-German issue of the German navy were very much in the foreground, it presently became clear to close observers that these alone would never cause the expected European conflict. France, England, and Germany, the most highly developed countries of the world, had, when all was said, too much at stake to want to risk it in a modern clash at arms with its colossal human sacrifices and its economic and financial ruin hardly less terrible to victor than to vanquished. France, Germany, and England, open to rational considerations, might at the last moment, if necessary, be brought to bridle their impatience, but such was not the case with Austria and Russia. These two were more primitive countries, among which the purely emotional element in human nature had more weight and which in addition directly neighbored on a region in a very difficult process of political reconstruction—the Balkan peninsula.

THE BALKAN PENINSULA.

The special problem of the Balkan peninsula arises from the circumstance that for two hundred years the Ottoman empire has been in dissolution. Originally Austria and Russia, the two powerful neighbors of the sultan, counted on getting the bulk of Turkey for themselves, but before long they were brought to see that the subject nationalities of the peninsula, the Greeks, the Roumanians, the Serbs, and the Bulgarians, had an opinion of their own in this matter, and were resolved to be free and independent. Austria and Russia therefore changed their policy. Austria occasionally and Russia far more consistently befriended the little states and peoples, by which action each power hoped to increase its influence over the Balkan midgets, besides getting some convenient slice of Turkish territory after all. In 1878, as a result of her war with Turkey, Russia acquired the Roumanian region of southern Bessarabia, and brought her boundary as far as the Danube delta. Finding after that acquisition the territory of Turkey-in-Europe substantially preempted, she fixed her gaze upon the city of Constantinople and the waters of the straits. These she

let it be understood in language cryptic indeed, but clear enough to leave no doubt as to its meaning, she regarded as marked for her eventual ownership.

The year 1878, which brought Russia the addition of Bessarabia, put Austria in possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The powers assembled in congress at Berlin voted that she be invited to occupy and administer them. And now from their respective vantage grounds the two rival monarchies began the game of influence among the little nationalities of the peninsula. It was a dark and devious diplomatic hunt conducted in a semi-oriental world and involving the spinning of an enormous web of unclean intrigues. The spectacle was far from edifying, but from the first Russia in manoeuvring for position had one inestimable advantage. The Serbs and Bulgarians were of the same race and religion as herself and she could draw them to her heart and bosom by sounding the Slav note. Thus began the Pan-Slav propaganda before which Austria was helpless. For Austria is a state of many nationalities—Germans, Hungarians, Slavs, Roumanians, and Italians—and any one-sided nationalist program is for her out of the question. A Pan-Slav agitation is particularly impossible, because two non-Slav peoples, the Germans and Hungarians, are the predominant elements of the state. Thus Austria saw herself outmanoeuvred and her influence substantially reduced.

SERVIA AND THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA.

It was under these circumstances that Austria in October, 1908, took the step of finally annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. She had after pacifying the provinces administered them with marked success for 30 years, and she could declare that, except for the purely nominal authority of the sultan they were wholly hers. But the most powerful protest against her action came not from the sultan but from Serbia. By stepping forward into the lists against Austria, Serbia became at a stroke a prime factor in the relations of the powers.

What moved Serbia to her bold challenge of an act which did not interfere with a vestige of any legal right of hers? First of all her strong nationalist sentiment which saw in Bosnia a Serb land destined ultimately to be joined with her. The truth is that Bosnia is inhabited by people of Serb speech, but owing to the fact that over half are either Mohammedan or Catholic and very hostile to the Serbs who are Greek Orthodox, there is a predominant desire to remain with Austria. Under the circumstances Serbia would hardly

have made the stir she did if she had not been secretly and openly encouraged by Russia. For Russia, engaged in a struggle for influence with Austria, saw the advantage of using Serbia as a cat's paw. She stood behind her little friend for six months till March, 1909, when observing that the affair was drifting into a conflict, for which, owing to her recent losses in the war with Japan she was not yet ready, she suddenly withdrew and whistled off her henchman. Thereupon the annexation of Bosnia was solemnly recognized by all Europe, including Serbia.

But it was a barren triumph. Russia, exasperated by her diplomatic defeat, resolved to have revenge. She pursued the Pan-Slav propaganda more fervently than ever and under the busy direction of her Servian minister, Hartwig, stimulated Serbia to carry the all-Serb propaganda into Bosnia. As already said, this province was in the main loyal and content, but large sections, above all of the peasant population, were undoubtedly of the same Orthodox church as the Serbs of the kingdom, and these, in the view of the Slav agitators, could be gradually fanaticized. The result was that Bosnia was slowly undermined with secret societies, nationalist literature, and political plots. On the score of their trying to constitute their scattered members into a single nationality the Serbs might reasonably make a bid for the world's sympathy, but it is also true that they were making trouble in a province which in the main would have none of them and which had in no uncertain way avowed its attachment to the house of Hapsburg. And worse of all, they were operating under the directions and with the money of the Russian government, whose chief interest in the matter was the ignoble one of creating an embarrassment for its Austrian rival. Austria also kept on the eternal *qui vive*, was obliged to increase her police and military guards on the frontier, and by fits and starts angrily lectured her cantankerous little neighbor. But her various measures effected nothing. Lilliputian Serbia, strong in the backing of its Russian Gulliver, impertinently held its ground. Thus matters stood, not greatly noticed by the rest of the world until the assassination last June, in the streets of the Bosnian capital, of the Austrian heir apparent and his wife.

THE WAR.

It was inevitable now that Austria, if she was going to defend her integrity, should take strong measures. She presented a violent ultimatum, insisting on the complete cessation of the Pan-Serb agitation and the drastic punishment of its ring-leaders. The answer Serbia dispatched was considered unsatisfactory, and on the evening of July 25th, the Austrian ambassador left Belgrade and war fol-

lowed. Thus far the affair was a purely Balkan difficulty. There had been many of these Balkan difficulties, even not a few Balkan wars in the last decades, but the united efforts of the powers had localized the conflict and prevented a general conflagration. Would the same thing happen once again?

The answer depended in the main on Russia. We need not assume that Russia had planned to bring about this very situation and now gleefully rushed to arms. But by her systematic encouragement of Servia she was inextricably committed to the little kingdom and was in simple honor bound to come to her assistance. Diplomatic intervention might have sufficed to secure the necessary guarantees for Servia, but there was no thought of restraint on the banks of the Neva, and on July 28th, the Russian government ordered a mobilization against Austria. Everyone who understands the situation of the European powers knows that a mobilization is tantamount to a declaration of war, for in a continent where all are armed and ready, the power that first gets its hand on the trigger has an inestimable advantage. Moreover Russia, in mobilizing, consciously declared war. The proof is supplied by the fact that, aware that it was impossible to wage war against Austria alone, she mobilized on July 29th against Germany also.

And therewith the great European conflict, which writers for decades had been picturing with all the terrors of the imagination, had become a reality. The date of its birth deserves to be fixed; July 28th, the day when one great power drew its sword against a second great power. Russia mobilized against Austria and Germany and all the rest followed merely as a matter of course. For now the system of alliances became automatically operative and power after power jumped into the fray at the bidding of its friend. The memorable and tragic fact remains that the real leaders of civilization, France, Germany, and England were drawn into the war over an eastern issue that was only remotely their affair.

Except for the solemn interest that gathers around the catastrophe of Europe one could dispense with the details of the spread of the conflict during the next days. Only a poetic optimism, creditable to the heart but based on ignorance, is privileged to entertain the belief that the three western powers could have stayed out of the struggle. In Germany the news of the Russian mobilization produced a series of frantic protests from the government. When they were not heeded at St. Petersburg, Emperor William on August 1st, some three days after Russia, gave orders in his turn to mobilize. France started action on the same day, and the next move plainly belonged to England.

THE CASE OF ENGLAND.

But the English move hung fire. The reason seems to be that the English obligations to her partners, France and Russia, while definite, were not comprehensive, and permitted England honorably to entertain the thought of avoiding the conflict. She treated with Germany, trying to persuade Germany not to do certain things, as, not to attack the French coast, not to attack the Russian coast, and to respect the neutrality of Belgium. Each of these matters was for her a *casus belli* and if she could have pledged Germany to an acceptance she might, while meeting all her obligations to her allies, have yet avoided war. The idea of the English ministry was in itself entirely commendable, for if England could be spared the horrors of the war it was the plain duty of the government to confer this benefit upon the people. But, on the other hand, it was a debatable question whether Germany would find it advantageous to limit her action against her two enemies, France and Russia, even in return for the neutrality of England. England was not making her proposals for Germany's profit, but for the profit of herself and her two allies, and if Germany, after due reflection, made up her mind that she was being asked to give more than she was getting it was her right to refuse the conditions. If England thereupon, quite logically and correctly from her own viewpoint, answered with a declaration of war, the act was hers as much as Germany's. The only reasonable historical comment is that England was too deeply pledged to the Franco-Russian alliance to retire at the last moment through the small loophole her obligations had left open.

BELGIUM.

But there remains a special question—the question of Belgium. Germany broke the neutrality of Belgium and from her unwillingness to offer a promise to England to respect that neutrality, it is plain that she intended to break it as soon as the war loomed in sight. She has thereby made herself guilty of a very grave breach of law and right, which the Chancellor in his address to the Reichstag on August 4th, frankly admitted. But though committing an international misdemeanor, Germany is not wholly without excuse. When the hour of supreme necessity strikes, treaties, no matter how solemnly worded, go up in smoke. Germany locked in the hostile embrace of France and Russia was under the primal necessity of national preservation, before which all lesser obligations dwindle and disappear. She could not wait for France and Russia to strike her at their leisure, she had to strike first; and in addition she had, by entering Belgium, to secure herself against the possible chance of

being outflanked on the Rhine. Whether the German excuse be allowed or not depends on one's evaluation of what constitutes a nation's necessity, but in any case the illegal infraction of Belgian neutrality must stand against the German account until such reparation as is possible has been made.

"THE KAISER DID IT."

The great European struggle which every gentle heart and generous mind has prayed for years might be avoided is now a dread reality and the civilization of the oldest and noblest continent of the globe hangs in the balance. In the face of the ruin which has already begun the appalled witnesses of the tragedy are questioning one another with white lips: How did it begin? Why did it begin? What are they fighting for? Who is to blame? No matter was ever more involved, and no answer is further removed from truth than the simple catch word that is welcomed by so many because it relieves them of the need of reflection. Only passion, not reason or knowledge, will be content to put the blame exclusively on Servia or Austria or Russia. Only passion will put the blame upon the Kaiser. And yet no individual has been accused more generally than he among our public. Doubtless the newspaper versions of the controversy, which have chiefly emanated from such biased centers as London and Paris, are one of the causes of this gross injustice. Doubtless, too, the common habit of looking for a scapegoat to bear the burden of the general guilt explains somewhat the drift of opinion. And if a scapegoat is to be selected, who more eligible than the Kaiser—the most familiar figure of European politics as well as the dread "war lord" of our comic press? That this "war lord" has for twenty-six years conscientiously watched over the peace of Germany and splendidly led her along all the paths of human labor ought to check the hasty conclusions of at least those who pride themselves upon forming their opinions squarely on the facts.

THE REAL CAUSES.

No, only fretful ignorance and firm-seated bias can put the blame upon the Kaiser. If it behooves poor mortals to distribute blame he is perhaps not altogether free from guilt, but neither, in varying measure, is every other government of Europe. Together they must bear the blame with their alliances, their ententes, their armaments, their lusts, their revenges and their jealousies. These brief pages have tried to disclose the origin of the war in so far as that origin is an affair of diplomacy. But even if the diplomatic story were told more fully than our limited space allows, it would be folly to think

that we would then have the whole truth in our possession. For behind this war there is more than politics and diplomacy. Behind it is the whole civilization of Europe which, brilliant though it be in some respects, must be suffering from many and wasting cankers to have been brought to this sorry pass. Let the newspapers and diplomats expatiate as much as they will on this or that "incident" which caused the war, the real reasons lie deep down at the very roots of our culture. They lie in our wild pursuit of wealth, in our rampant commercialism, in our race hatreds, in our insufficient love of our fellowmen, in our competitive and military psychology, and in a hundred other things constituting in their totality what we boastingly refer to as our civilization.

CONCLUSION.

To talk of peace while the cannons fill the earth with their roar may look almost like a savage hoax, but peace, a durable peace, should even now be hopefully looked forward to as the only reasonable end of all these calamities. I have no desire to speculate as to what the war may bring, what territorial changes may be effected, and what awful price will be exacted of the vanquished. I would merely like to point out that, above all speculation, one thing is certain: governments may pass, dynasties may vanish, but the peoples of Europe will remain substantially as they are within their historic boundaries. But these battered and impoverished peoples will be preserved for no other purpose than for new wars and new disasters if they do not fit themselves out with a new *mind*. And that means that the individual—for everything depends in the last analysis on him—must learn the lesson of peace and love for which in Europe, much more than in America, he is as yet not greatly receptive. If the European man does not acquire a new set of dominant ideas, the present war, irrespective of who wins or loses, can only add another mass of terrible rancors to those already existing. Rancor piled on rancor—that way madness lies. Europe has followed a wrong track and must imperatively call a halt. To do that is not an easy matter, for a change of direction requires a difficult self-conquest followed by a steady inner renewal of every nation and its individual members. Such moral triumphs may not lie within the reach of those poor, distracted populations, but without them it is certain that the old system will continue with no abatement even after the war is over, and that the present struggle will merely breed an endless succession of new ones. Brothers, let us pray for peace, but not for the peace imposed by the sword or by an irresistible combination of the strong. That is the military peace of which Europe has proved the danger and impermanence. Let us pray rather for the peace that is based on the deep conviction of every man and woman in the civilized world and grows and blossoms in the individual consciousness.

San, Calif.
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